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FORECASTING DISRUPTION, FORFEITING 
SPEECH: RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENT 
SPEECH IN EXTRACURRICULAR 
ACTIVITIES 
Abstract: The First Amendment speech rights of public school students 
engaged in extracurricular activities occupy a doctrinal no-man’s land be-
tween individual expression and a government-controlled curriculum. 
Applying Supreme Court precedent, courts tend to characterize extracur-
ricular student speech as either individual speech under Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent School District or “school-sponsored” speech under Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier. More recently, some courts have analogized stu-
dents to government employees, particularly when school officials “fore-
cast” that speech will be disruptive. Voluntary, extracurricular activities, 
and student speech within those activities, play essential roles in education. 
Applying a forecast of disruption standard, however, to student extracur-
ricular speech shifts the burden from schools to students to show that 
speech is not disruptive. As a result, the forecast of disruption standard 
may condition student participation on giving up free speech rights, con-
trary to schools’ educational missions. This Note proposes requiring 
school officials relying on a forecast of disruption to punish student 
speech to demonstrate that the disruption materially and substantially in-
terferes with the educational goal of the particular extracurricular activity. 
Introduction 
 At a basketball game in February 2009, Silsbee High School offi-
cials gave sixteen-year-old H.S., a female student and cheerleader, a 
choice: cheer by name for basketball star Rakheem Bolton or leave the 
game.1 Four months prior, in October 2008, H.S. had attended a party 
where Bolton and two other young men allegedly raped her.2 Bolton 
was arrested two days after the incident, but a grand jury elected not to 
indict him, and Bolton returned to school in January 2009.3 H.S. began 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 Selena Roberts, High School Dissonance, Sports Illustrated, Nov. 8, 2010, at 82, 82; 
David L. Hudson, Jr., 5th Circuit: Cheerleader Can’t Refuse to Cheer, First Amendment Center 
(Sept. 24, 2010), http://archive.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=23416. 
2 Bob Egelko, Cheerleader Suit Tackles Students’ Rights Issue, S.F. Chron., Nov. 5, 2010, at 
A14. 
3 Id.; Roberts, supra note 1, at 82. Bolton and a teammate were later indicted on sexual 
assault charges; Bolton pled guilty to a misdemeanor assault charge, was fined $2500, and was 
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therapy and was advised to maintain her routine as a way to cope with 
the trauma she had experienced, including continuing to cheer with 
the high school cheerleading squad.4 
 The squad had a custom of cheering for basketball players by 
name when the players took foul shots.5 At the game in February, H.S. 
refused to cheer for Bolton and instead folded her arms, stepped back 
from the group, and sat down in silence.6 At half time, school officials 
told H.S. to cheer for Bolton by name or go home, and H.S. left with 
her parents.7 The following week, the cheerleading coach removed 
H.S. from the squad for the remainder of the season.8 
 H.S. and her parents sued the district attorney, Silsbee Independ-
ent School District (“SISD”), the superintendent, principal, the coach, 
and Rakheem Bolton.9 They argued that H.S.’s silence constituted 
symbolic expression, and that removing H.S. from the cheerleading 
squad violated her First Amendment rights to freedom of speech.10 
 In October 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and, in September 
2010, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed 
the decision de novo and affirmed the dismissal of the First Amend-
ment claim.11 Reasoning that H.S. “was contractually required to 
cheer,” the Fifth Circuit concluded that H.S.’s “failure to cheer consti-
                                                                                                                      
ordered to perform 150 hours of community service and to enroll in an anger-management 
course. Egelko, supra note 2. 
4 Roberts, supra note 1, at 82. 
5 Id. 
6 Egelko, supra note 2. 
7 Id. 
8 Id.; Roberts, supra note 1, at 82. H.S. was permitted to cheer with the squad the fol-
lowing year. Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852, 853 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011). 
9 Doe, 402 F. App’x at 853. 
10 See id. at 855. H.S. and her parents also claimed that the District Attorney deprived 
H.S. of her First Amendment rights to freedom of speech by retaliating against H.S. for 
filing sexual assault charges against Rakheem Bolton and another student allegedly in-
volved in the attack in October, Christian Rountree. Id. at 853, 855. 
11 See id. at 853, 856. The attorney for H.S. and her parents requested a review of the 
three-judge panel’s decision by the full Court of Appeals and, in February 2011, they ap-
pealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at 12, Doe, 402 F. App’x 852 (No. 10-1056), 2010 WL 3736233, at *1–2; Bob Egelko, 
Texas Cheerleader Takes Lawsuit to Supreme Court, S.F. Chron., Dec. 23, 2010, at A11; David L. 
Hudson, Jr., Cheerleader’s Silence Not ‘Disruptive,’ First Amendment Center (Nov. 11, 2010), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/cheerleaders-silence-not-disruptive. The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in May 2011. Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 131 S. Ct. 2875, 2875 
(2011). 
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tuted valid grounds for her removal” from the squad.12 By participating 
in the extracurricular activity, H.S. voluntarily forfeited individual 
speech rights and became the school’s representative: “H.S. served as a 
mouthpiece through which SISD could disseminate speech—namely, 
support for its athletic teams.”13 
 In a four-page opinion, the Fifth Circuit held that H.S.’s silence 
was substantially disruptive because she attended the basketball game 
voluntarily, for the purpose of cheering.14 Although in some circum-
stances schools must tolerate individual student speech, the court rea-
soned that the school was not required to “promote H.S.’s message by 
allowing her to cheer or not cheer, as she saw fit.”15 
 H.S.’s case tests the limits placed on public school students’ First 
Amendment speech rights when they participate in extracurricular ac-
tivities.16 Although the Framers in 1791 included the right to freedom 
of speech in the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights, the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s recognition of students’ First Amendment speech rights 
is relatively recent.17 In 1969, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School District, the Court set out strong protections for student 
speech in public schools.18 In student speech cases since Tinker, how-
ever, the Court has shown greater deference to school officials to regu-
late school environments.19 The Court has recognized that students’ 
                                                                                                                      
 
12 Doe, 402 F. App’x at 853–54. 
13 See id. at 855. 
14 Id.; see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
15 Doe, 402 F. App’x at 855; see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 
(1988). 
16 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I; see 
also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (stating that students are “persons” under the Constitution both 
in school and outside of school). 
17 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14. See generally Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression 
and Democracy in America: A History (2008) (providing a historical overview of the 
First Amendment); Christopher M. Finan, From the Palmer Raids to the PATRIOT 
Act: A History of the Fight for Free Speech in America (2007) (same). 
18 393 U.S. at 506, 512–13. See generally Edward C. Bolmeier, Legal Limits of Au-
thority over the Pupil (1970) (providing a contemporary legal analysis of student 
speech rights, published in the year following the Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker). 
19 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71; Erwin C. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: 
Principles and Policies 1151 (3d ed. 2006); Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School 
and Prison, 85 Wash. L. Rev. 71, 81–82, 89–90 (2010). See generally Marjorie Heins, Not in 
Front of the Children: “Indecency,” Censorship, and the Innocence of Youth 
(2001) (providing an overview of free expression and censorship issues pertaining to 
youth); Kevin W. Saunders, Saving Our Children from the First Amendment (2003) 
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speech rights are “not automatically coextensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings.”20 Those rights may be restricted “in light of 
the special characteristics of the school environment,”21 and school of-
ficials are not obligated to tolerate student speech that “would under-
mine the school’s basic educational mission.”22 
                                                                                                                     
 It may be helpful to analyze student speech in extracurricular ac-
tivities in the context of the broader doctrinal spectrum of courts’ stu-
dent speech decisions.23 At one end of this spectrum, student speech 
rights are most restricted in the classroom and in other curricular set-
tings.24 At the other end of the spectrum, student speech is least re-
stricted when students speak as individuals, when it is clear that the 
message conveyed is their own.25 Student speech cases typically involve 
a balance between students’ speech rights and the school’s ability to 
control its message and to achieve educational goals, including in 
school-sponsored contexts beyond the classroom.26 Courts frequently 
distinguish student speech in curricular contexts from non-curricular 
student speech, such as student attire.27 Extracurricular student speech 
 
 
(providing an analysis advocating greater restrictions on First Amendment rights of 
youth). 
20 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
21 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
22 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
23 See Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public 
Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 663, 728 (1987) (describing a “continuum” 
of speech protection within public schools in which student speech receives less protection 
in contexts of school activities that have greater educational content). 
24 See Hazelwood, 393 U.S. at 271; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; Hafen, supra note 23, at 
728. 
25 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; Hafen, supra note 23, at 728. 
26 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Teaching That Speech Matters: A Framework for Analyz-
ing Speech Issues in Schools, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 825 (2009) (analyzing student speech 
rights in light of Morse v. Frederick and concluding that courts should only defer to school 
officials’ decisions to restrict curricular student speech, and should protect student speech 
that is outside the curriculum); Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really Be “Free Speech” in 
Public Schools? 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 45 (2008) (examining ways the Supreme Court 
has defined the educational mission of schools in applying student speech standards); 
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 Fla. L. Rev 1027 (2008) 
(examining scope of student speech rights in use of digital media and concluding that 
courts tend to give school officials too much authority to restrict student speech rights in 
student expression through digital media); Mark Yudof, Tinker Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, 
and Student Expression, 69 St. John’s L. Rev. 365 (1995) (analyzing the evolution of this 
balance between student speech rights and schools’ restrictions on student speech in the 
twenty-five years following the Tinker decision). 
27 See B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 736–39 (8th Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing that a Confederate flag on student clothing was inherently disruptive in the context of 
race-related violence at school and within the community); Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. 
Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 530–31 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that buttons worn on student clothing 
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fits on this spectrum between curricular and non-curricular speech— 
that is, between individual speech generally evaluated under Tinker and 
school-sponsored speech evaluated under the framework that the Su-
preme Court set out in 1988 in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.28 
 This intermediary doctrinal position between curricular and non-
curricular speech arises from the complementary role that extracur-
ricular activities play in students’ education.29 Student speech cases 
arise in a wide range of extracurricular contexts, including participa-
tion in student athletic teams,30 newspapers,31 performance groups,32 
cheerleading squads,33 clubs,34 or government.35 Although traditionally 
educational institutions exercise greater control over curriculum than 
over voluntary, extracurricular activities, those activities frequently in-
volve significant school resources, such as facilities and instruction, and 
serve educational goals.36 
                                                                                                                      
 
containing the word “scab” were not inherently disruptive); Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense 
of High School Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 657, 699–712 
(2009). 
28 484 U.S. at 270–71; see Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 588–89 (6th Cir. 2007); Ha-
fen, supra note 23, at 728. 
29 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 845–46 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that extracurricular activities are part of the school’s educational program and are 
central to students’ educational experience and college prospects); infra notes 257–266 
and accompanying text. This Note defines an extracurricular activity as a voluntary en-
deavor for which students do not primarily receive academic credit (though the activity 
may complement the required curriculum), which may occur on school grounds, be or-
ganized by the public school, and be sustained by resources provided by the school to sup-
port the activity. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71; Dean v. Utica Cmty. Sch., 345 F. 
Supp. 2d. 799, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
30 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 587–88; Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 759 
(9th Cir. 2006); Wildman ex rel. Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 769 (8th 
Cir. 2001); Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1028 (10th Cir. 2000). 
31 See Lueneberg v. Everett Sch. Dist. No. 2, No. C05-2070RSM, 2007 WL 2069859, at 
*6–8 (W.D. Wash. July 13, 2007); Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d. at 804; Desilets ex rel. Desilets v. 
Clearview Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 630 A.2d 333, 338 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). 
32 See Cleveland v. Blount Cnty. Sch. Dist. 00050, No. 3:05-CV-380, 2008 WL 250403, at 
*3 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2008); see also Alison Leigh Cowan, Play About Iraq War Divides a 
Connecticut School, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 2007, at B1 (describing a high school administra-
tors’ decision to cancel a student-written play about the war in Iraq). 
33 See Doe, 402 F. App’x at 855. 
34 See Boyd Cnty. High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667, 
669, 691 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
35 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2008); Henerey ex rel. Henerey v. 
City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128, 1132–33 (8th Cir. 1999); Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 
758–59 (6th Cir. 1989). 
36 See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004); Romano v. Har-
rington, 725 F. Supp. 687, 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[E]ducators may exercise greater edito-
rial control over what students write for class than what they voluntarily submit to an extra-
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 Student speech in extracurricular activities may also be examined 
in the context of First Amendment rights available in other govern-
ment-regulated institutions—where speech generally receives less pro-
tection; a particularly useful comparison is to public employees’ speech 
rights because, like government employees, students in extracurricular 
activities may be viewed as representing the school.37 Although courts 
frequently defer to government institutions in regulating speech, these 
institutions’ missions include cultivating and ultimately contributing to 
the broader “marketplace of ideas.”38 In early cases addressing student 
speech rights, the Supreme Court emphasized that schools should 
teach students to be free-thinking citizens in a democracy.39 Ideally, 
public schools harmonize the pursuit of institutional goals with uphold-
ing student speech rights.40 
 However, student participation in extracurricular activities may en-
tail greater government regulation than curricular activities, rather than 
less.41 The voluntary nature of extracurricular activities reduces the 
school’s control over student speech that takes place outside of curricu-
lar settings.42 The Supreme Court, however, has upheld school policies 
                                                                                                                      
curricular, albeit school-funded, publication.”); see also Pinard, 467 F.3d at 769–70 (describ-
ing school resources spent to schedule a basketball game). 
37 See Doe, 402 F. App’x at 855; Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 
Duke L.J. 821, 829 (2008) (arguing that lawmakers defer to government institutions’ re-
strictions on speech only to the extent that such restrictions advance the marketplace of 
ideas); Caplan, supra note 19, at 74; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian 
Institutions, 32 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 441, 441–43 (1999); Hafen, supra note 23, at 722–25; 
Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive 
Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1635, 1639–41 (2007) 
(examining two arguments used to support judicial deference to government institutions’ 
restrictions on speech— “waiver” and “risk” —and proposing that courts apply intermedi-
ate scrutiny instead of strict scrutiny to such claims). 
38 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512; Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) 
(“The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends 
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to [a] robust exchange of ideas . . . .”); 
Blocher, supra note 37, at 829. Protecting free and open debate in a “marketplace of ideas” 
has long been considered a principal purpose of the First Amendment. See Abrams v. Unit-
ed States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”); Geof-
frey R. Stone et al., The First Amendment 9–10 (3d ed. 2008). 
39 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511–12; W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
637 (1943) (“That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous 
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free 
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as 
mere platitudes.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 826. 
40 See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 826. 
41 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 845–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Lowery, 497 F.3d at 597. 
42 See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289; Romano, 725 F. Supp. at 690. 
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that restrict other constitutional rights of students participating in extra-
curricular activities.43 For example, in 2002, in Board of Education v. Earls, 
the Court held that public schools may require students to submit to 
random, suspicionless urinalysis drug testing as a condition of partici-
pating in competitive extracurricular activities, eroding the students’ 
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches.44 The policy 
applied to an array of activities, including athletics, cheerleading, 
marching band, choir, and the “Academic Team.”45 As in the Fourth 
Amendment context, when students participate in voluntary extracur-
ricular activities, to what degree do they also waive First Amendment 
speech rights?46 
 This Note analyzes the First Amendment speech rights of public 
school students participating in extracurricular activities.47 Part I reviews 
Supreme Court precedent and the implications of these standards for 
                                                                                                                      
43 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 825–26, 828; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 
656–57, 664–65 (1995) (holding that school policy of conducting random, suspicionless 
urinalysis drug testing on students participating in school district’s athletic programs did 
not violate Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, based in part on student athletes’ re-
duced legitimate expectation of privacy compared to that of other students because stu-
dent athletes voluntarily subject themselves to greater regulation than other students). But 
see York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995, 1006 (Wash. 2008) (holding that a 
school’s warrantless, random drug testing of student athletes as condition of participating 
in extracurricular interscholastic athletics violated the state constitution); Theodore v. Del. 
Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 76, 78, 92 (Pa. 2003) (holding unconstitutional on state law 
grounds a school policy that authorized random, suspicionless drug and alcohol testing of 
all students participating in any extracurricular activities—defined as activities in which 
students participate on a voluntary basis and for which academic credit is not awarded—
unless the school demonstrated a specific need for the policy and the policy addressed that 
need). 
44 536 U.S. at 825–26, 828; see U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Caplan, supra note 19, at 
102–04 (comparing Fourth Amendment rights available in jails and schools to demon-
strate that constitutional rights in these two types of government institutions—including 
First Amendment speech rights—are similarly restricted). 
45 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 826. 
46 See id.; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 597; Moss, supra note 37, at 1645–48 (asserting that stu-
dents, like others speaking in the context of government institutional oversight, may have 
“waived” a degree of speech protection by choosing not to leave the school district instead 
of giving up rights, but concluding that this argument is only tenable if the students’ 
“choice” is realistic). 
47 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 597. In general, First Amendment 
challenges brought by public school students are brought by middle and high school stu-
dents. Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1029 n.5. Under the state action doctrine, the First 
Amendment applies only when the entity restricting the expression is a state actor; private 
school students may not claim that their schools have infringed their speech rights under 
the First Amendment. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 
U.S. 288, 295, 298–99 (2001); Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1029 n.5. 
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student speech in extracurricular contexts.48 Part II surveys lower court 
applications of these standards in extracurricular settings and demon-
strates that, although courts do not always rely on a single standard, 
courts tend to treat extracurricular student speech as either curriculum-
like, school-sponsored speech, or as individual speech under Tinker.49 In 
particular, Part II conducts a close analysis of restrictions on student ath-
letes’ speech using a “forecast” of disruption under Tinker and demon-
strates how courts combine this standard with analogies to public em-
ployment to support restricting student speech.50 Part III analyzes the 
doctrinal and practical effects of this approach in light of the essential 
role extracurricular activities play in education.51 Part III also proposes 
requiring school officials using a forecast of disruption to connect the 
restriction on student speech to the educational goal of the particular 
extracurricular activity.52 This Note argues that using a forecast of dis-
ruption conditions student participation in extracurricular activities on 
giving up First Amendment speech protections, a result that contradicts 
educational goals.53 
I. Supreme Court Precedents: Student Speech Rights in School 
 In early cases addressing the First Amendment expressive rights of 
public elementary and secondary school students, the Supreme Court 
recognized that students retain broad constitutional rights in school, 
including the right not to speak.54 Later cases, however, weaken student 
speech rights, eliminating protection for student speech in two narrow 
categories—vulgar speech and speech that advocates illegal drug use— 
and eroding student speech protections in school-sponsored contexts.55 
A. Tinker: Student Speech Inside the Schoolhouse Gate 
 In 1969, in Tinker, the Supreme Court set a strong standard to pro-
tect student speech, including in extracurricular settings: school offi-
cials may suppress student speech only if the speech materially and sub-
                                                                                                                      
48 See infra notes 54–100 and accompanying text. 
49 See infra notes 101–215 and accompanying text. 
50 See infra notes 147–194 and accompanying text. 
51 See infra notes 216–270 and accompanying text. 
52 See infra notes 271–289 and accompanying text. 
53 See infra notes 216–270 and accompanying text. 
54 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (holding that public school students may not be com-
pelled to salute the American flag as part of the school day); Papandrea, supra note 26, at 
1038. 
55 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 397; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685–86. 
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stantially disrupts the work of the school or infringes on others’ 
rights.56 Middle and high school students John F. Tinker, Mary Beth 
Tinker, and Christopher Eckhardt wore black armbands to school to 
demonstrate their opposition to the Vietnam War and were sus-
pended.57 In upholding the students’ First Amendment speech rights, 
the Court distinguished curricular speech from non-curricular 
speech58 and sought to balance protecting student speech rights with 
upholding school officials’ authority to maintain order, discipline, and 
to achieve the school’s educational mission.59 
                                                                                                                     
 Famously declaring that students do not “shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”60 
the Supreme Court held that the armbands did not cause any actual or 
substantial disruption to the school’s work or classes.61 Singling out the 
black armbands constituted impermissible viewpoint-based discrimina-
tion against political expression.62 
 In an observation that has since become more directly relevant to 
the extracurricular context, the Tinker Court also specified that stu-
dents’ First Amendment rights in schools extend beyond the classroom, 
both through personal communication among students and in extra-
curricular and non-curricular settings.63 Student speech rights are pro-
tected when a student “is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on 
the campus during the authorized hours,” as long as that expression 
 
56 See 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
57 Id. at 504. See generally John W. Johnson, The Struggle for Student Rights: 
Tinker v. Des Moines and the 1960s (1997) (providing a history of the Tinker case). 
58 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
59 See id. at 512–13. 
60 Id. at 506. 
61 Id. at 508, 514. 
62 See id. at 510–11. The distinction between content-based speech restrictions (either 
viewpoint-based or subject matter-based) and content-neutral speech restrictions is central 
to First Amendment law. See Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 932–34. Viewpoint-based re-
strictions are presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the 
speech restriction be narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling government interest. See id. 
at 540–42, 932–34. In government-regulated institutions, however, content-based restric-
tions receive greater deference. See id. at 1154. Typically, viewpoint-based restrictions are 
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the forum, but subject matter restrictions in a non-
public forum are subject only to rational basis review. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71; 
Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 1152–53. For a discussion of public forum doctrine, see 
infra note 83. As a premise, this Note assumes that Supreme Court student speech prece-
dents make clear that viewpoint-based restrictions of student speech are permitted in 
schools in certain circumstances. See Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: 
A New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 63, 66 (2008) (“The 
real question is not whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination, but when.”). 
63 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
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does not materially and substantially interfere with the work of the 
school or infringe others’ rights.64 
 For the Tinker Court, student speech in these settings must be pro-
tected because free speech is crucial to education; the classroom is “pe-
culiarly the marketplace of ideas,” a setting for training future leaders 
in democracy exposed to a “robust exchange of ideas.”65 Lower courts 
have applied the language in Tinker permitting school officials to re-
strict student speech not only when they can demonstrate that actual 
disruption occurred, but also when officials can reasonably forecast it.66 
The Tinker Court reasoned, however, that school officials have the bur-
den of showing that a particular speech prohibition is “caused by some-
thing more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleas-
antness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”67 
B. Supreme Court Student Speech Cases After Tinker 
 In the decades after Tinker, the Supreme Court carved out limita-
tions to the disruption standard.68 In 1986, in Bethel School District No. 
403 v. Fraser, the Court held that school officials could punish a high 
school student for using “lewd” speech at a school assembly.69 Student 
Matthew N. Fraser’s speech nominating a friend for student body vice 
president during a school assembly contained sexual innuendo.70 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
64 Id. 
65 See id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603). 
66 See id. at 514; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 592–93; Pinard, 467 F.3d at 772. 
67 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. The justices disagreed on the degree of deference to grant 
school officials. See id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should defer to 
school officials to maintain “discipline and good order” in schools). In 1982, in Board of 
Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, Justice William Brennan, writ-
ing for a plurality of the Supreme Court, built on Tinker to hold that, although courts 
should grant broad deference to school officials to select books for the school library, dis-
cretion remained limited. 457 U.S. 853, 868, 870–72 (1982). Pico further established that 
students’ First Amendment rights to speak in school necessarily include the right to re-
ceive information, such as the right to choose library books. See id. at 867–68; Yudof, supra 
note 26, at 370–71. The Court held that school officials’ disapproval of the content of li-
brary books alone would be insufficient to support removing them from the school library. 
See Pico, 457 U.S. at 871–72. 
68 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685–86; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
69 478 U.S. at 685. The full text of student Matthew Fraser’s speech is reprinted in Jus-
tice Brennan’s concurring opinion. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Justice Brennan remarked that, having read the speech, it was “difficult to believe that it is 
the same speech the Court describes.” Id. 
70 Id.; see Yudof, supra note 26, at 373–74. As Justice Brennan noted, Fraser’s speech did 
not fall into the category of “obscene” speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); see Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484–85 (1957) (“But implicit 
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day after the assembly, the school’s assistant principal notified Fraser 
that the speech violated a school rule prohibiting obscene language.71 
Fraser was suspended for three days, and his name was removed from 
the list of candidates for graduation speaker.72 
 The Supreme Court in Fraser added an exception to the Tinker dis-
ruption standard, creating a second, narrower category of student 
speech doctrine: both in the classroom and in school-sponsored extra-
curricular settings, such as student government speeches, school offi-
cials could restrict “vulgar and lewd” student speech.73 The Court de-
ferred to school officials and implied that regulating Fraser’s speech 
was constitutional because “vulgar and lewd speech” is inherently dis-
ruptive and would interfere with the school’s educational mission.74 
The Fraser majority reasoned that public schools may dissociate them-
selves from a student’s individual message when the speaker’s identity 
might be unclear; to maintain order, discipline, and control in the 
school environment; and to teach boundaries of civility and appropri-
ate conduct.75 Justice John Paul Stevens, though dissenting, agreed with 
the majority of the Court that school officials could restrict student use 
of expletives in extracurricular activities when those activities were 
school-sponsored and conducted on school grounds, in addition to re-
stricting such speech in classroom discussion.76 
 In 1988, in Hazelwood, the Supreme Court introduced a third stan-
dard for assessing student speech protections, holding that school offi-
                                                                                                                      
in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without re-
deeming social importance.”). 
71 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678. 
72 Id. The Fraser rule appears to have adopted the Tinker disruption standard but spe-
cifically applied it to “obscene” language; the rule provided: “Conduct which materially 
and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of 
obscene, profane language or gestures.” See id. Despite the removal of his name from the 
list of candidates for graduation speaker, Fraser was elected graduation speaker by a write-
in vote and delivered a speech at commencement. Id. at 679. 
73 See id. at 685–86; Waldman, supra note 62, at 70. 
74 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685–86 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court did not apply 
Tinker’s material and substantial disruption standard. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 
1047. 
75 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683, 685–86 (“The inculcation of these values is truly the ‘work 
of the schools.’” (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508)). 
76 See id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, in his dissent, focused on the 
disciplinary reaction to Fraser’s speech, noting that students are entitled to fair notice of 
what speech may be punishable, and the scope of potential repercussions. See id.; see also 
Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus Punishment, 85 Ind. L.J. 
1113, 1114 (2010) (arguing that students punished for their speech after the fact must be 
given adequate prior notice and that punishment should be reviewed for reasonableness). 
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cials may regulate student speech in the context of a school-sponsored, 
“expressive” activity that “students, parents, and members of the public 
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”77 
Prior to publication of a student newspaper written as part of a journal-
ism class, the school principal deleted two articles that described di-
vorce in students’ families and students’ experiences with teen preg-
nancies.78 The Court distinguished individual student speech that 
schools must tolerate under Tinker’s disruption standard from school-
sponsored speech.79 Such activities “may fairly be characterized as part 
of the school curriculum,” even when they occur outside the classroom 
in an extracurricular setting, if the activity is (1) supervised by faculty 
members and (2) “designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to 
student participants and audiences.”80 
 The Supreme Court’s analysis in Hazelwood arguably marks the be-
ginning of a shift in the Court’s doctrinal starting point, from examin-
ing the identity of the speaker to scrutinizing the context of the speech 
at issue.81 Once Hazelwood applies to the activity, to pass constitutional 
muster, the restriction on student speech must reasonably relate to “le-
gitimate pedagogical concerns.”82 The Supreme Court in Hazelwood 
held that the newspaper was a nonpublic forum because publication 
took place in the context of classroom time and instruction, and thus 
school officials could regulate its content.83 Hazelwood thus affirmed the 
                                                                                                                      
 
77 484 U.S. at 271–73. Lower courts have interpreted Supreme Court precedent to es-
tablish three categories of student speech: (1) vulgar, lewd speech governed by Fraser; (2) 
school-sponsored speech governed by Hazelwood; and (3) all other speech governed by 
Tinker. See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 588; LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988–89 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (citing Chandler v. McMinville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992)); 
Cordes, supra note 27, at 667–68. 
78 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262–63. The school principal censored the newspaper be-
cause he felt that the parents whose divorce was described in one of the articles should 
have been given an opportunity to respond to the student’s remarks or to consent to pub-
lication, and that the identity of pregnant students quoted in the pregnancy story might 
still be apparent, despite the use of pseudonyms. Id. at 263–64. In a footnote, the Court 
addressed the prong of Tinker dealing with the invasion of the rights of others, declining to 
decide whether Tinker meant that school officials could censor the newspaper only if the 
speech therein could have resulted in tort liability for the school. See id. at 273 n.5. See gen-
erally Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of Hazelwood, 26 
Ga. L. Rev. 253 (1992) (providing a contemporary analysis of the impact of Hazelwood). 
79 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71. 
80 See id. at 271. 
81 See id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 832. 
82 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; Waldman, supra note 62, at 112. 
83 484 U.S. at 269–70. The Supreme Court has defined three different arenas in which 
government actors may regulate speech, each characterized by a different level of protec-
tion for speech rights. See Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 1127. In a traditional, public 
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assertion in Fraser that school officials have broad control over speech in 
the classroom and other school-sponsored settings and may restrict stu-
dent speech based on the viewpoint expressed in such nonpublic fo-
rums.84 
 Further, Hazelwood applies outside the classroom—and to extra-
curricular activities that the school can demonstrate are school-
sponsored and might reasonably be perceived to bear the school’s “im-
primatur.”85 Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harold 
Blackmun, dissenting in Hazelwood, argued that schools need not spon-
sor student curricular or extracurricular work that was “ungrammatical, 
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced,” but 
educators could apply the Tinker disruption standard to justify making 
                                                                                                                      
forum, such as a public park or sidewalk, government exclusions may be viewpoint-based 
or subject matter-based only if the government satisfies strict scrutiny, demonstrating that 
the restriction serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44–46 (1983). The govern-
ment also may make reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in a public forum as 
long as the restrictions are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest, and leave open ample alternative means of communication. Id. at 45–46. 
In a limited or “designated” public forum, the government opens up a forum for speech to 
be generally available to a class of speakers (e.g., students). Rosenberger v. Rector & Visi-
tors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–30 (1995); Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46; Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981). The government may not discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint in a limited public forum unless it satisfies strict scrutiny (as in a public forum), 
and content-neutral restrictions must adhere to reasonable time, place, and manner re-
strictions. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46. But see Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 
U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (holding that speech in a limited public forum may be restricted as 
long as the restriction is viewpoint-neutral and “reasonable in light of the purpose served 
by the forum” (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
806 (1985))). Finally, in a nonpublic forum, the government may restrict speech as long as 
the restriction is reasonable and made on a viewpoint-neutral basis. See Members of City 
Cou
 Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored 
Acti
ucators do not offend the First 
Ame ntrol over the style and content of student speech in 
scho
 U.S. at 271. 
ncil of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814–15 (1984) (holding that lamp-
posts constituted a nonpublic forum); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; Chemerinksy, supra note 19, 
at 1139. 
One scholar has provided a discussion of the debate about the role of public forum 
analysis in student free speech cases. See Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amend-
ment Category: Bringing Order
vities, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 717, 721 (2009) (describing this debate and proposing a 
new category of forum analysis under which to evaluate free speech claims in public 
schools—the “nonforum”). 
84 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270, 273 (“[W]e hold that ed
ndment by exercising editorial co
ol-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
85 See Hazelwood, 484
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such edits.86 The Hazelwood Court’s analysis of the type of speech forum 
and its focus on whether the speech at issue could reasonably be con-
strued to bear the school’s imprimatur permits schools to apply a cur-
ricular standard to school-sponsored speech to extracurricular speech 
eyo
nt of speech that could reasonably be per-
b nd the classroom.87 
 The Supreme Court further eroded Tinker in its most recent deci-
sion on student speech rights in school.88 In 2007, in Morse v. Frederick, 
the Court held that a school official may constitutionally restrict stu-
dent speech that is reasonably regarded as promoting illegal drug 
use.89 In January 2002, as the Olympic Torch Relay processed through 
Juneau, Alaska, Juneau-Douglas High School senior Joseph Frederick 
stood on the sidewalk across the street from the school and unfurled a 
fourteen-foot, homemade banner proclaiming, “BONG HiTS 4 JE-
SUS.”90 The Supreme Court reasoned that the concern with Freder-
ick’s speech was not its perceived offensiveness, but rather the promo-
tion of illegal drug use, and that school officials could punish such ad-
vocacy because drug use threatens student safety.91 Frederick’s speech 
at the Olympic Torch Relay took place in the context of the school en-
vironment because it occurred during normal school hours, and be-
cause student and staff attendance was school-sanctioned, like a class 
trip or school-sanctioned social event.92 This holding in Morse applies 
Hazelwood beyond school-sponsored events to any event permitted by 
the school, but, within such settings, it only addresses the permissibility 
of suppression or punishme
ceived to advocate illegal drug use.93 
 Although Tinker has not been overruled, the Court has eroded 
protection for student speech over time and shown greater deference 
                                                                                                                      
86 See id. at 283–84 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, the school could distance itself 
from student speech by publishing a disclaimer in the newspaper or by issuing its own 
resp
 standard 
and rum doctrine to student free speech cases). 
, 551 U.S. at 396–97. 
; advocacy of illegal drug use posed a 
thre 424–25. 
onse. See id. at 289. 
87 See id. at 270–71 (majority opinion); Brownstein, supra note 83, at 768 (2009); Salo-
mone, supra note 78, at 275–84, 316 (analyzing lower courts’ use of the Hazelwood
 various applications of public fo
88 See Morse
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 397. 
91 See id. at 409. In a concurring opinion, Justice Samuel Alito stated that, although 
school officials may censor student speech if a reasonable observer would interpret it to 
promote illegal drug use, speech about a political or social issue is protected. See id. at 422 
(Alito, J., concurring). Further, the special characteristics of the school setting exposed 
students to dangers they would not face otherwise
at to students’ physical safety. See id. at 
92 See id. at 400 (majority opinion). 
93 See id.; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71; Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 830. 
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to school officials.94 Tinker set strong protections for student expres-
sion, including speech in extracurricular activities: school officials may 
restrict student speech only when the speech materially and substan-
tially disrupts a legitimate curricular function or infringes the rights of 
others.95 Under Fraser, school officials may restrict lewd or vulgar stu-
dent speech in a school-sponsored, educational setting when that 
speech interferes with the school’s educational mission and the 
school’s efforts to teach “the boundaries of socially appropriate behav-
ior.”96 Morse similarly presents another narrow standard, focused on 
restricting speech that could reasonably be perceived to advocate illegal 
drug use within the school environment.97 In Hazelwood, the Court 
granted broad leeway to school officials to restrict student speech in 
extracurricular activities that are school-sponsored if the restriction is 
reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.98 The Hazel-
wood pedagogical concern test thus permits schools to treat an inher-
ently “expressive” extracurricular activity as curricular, even when it oc-
curs outside of the classroom.99 In other settings, however, the Tinker 
forecast of disruption standard permits schools to suppress or punish 
individual stude  
udents’ First Amendment 
ee
                                                                                                                     
nt speech in anticipation of disruption.100
II. Extracurricular Student Speech 
 Cases involving student expression in the context of extracurricu-
lar activities involve a balance between st
sp ch rights and deference to school officials to carry out the school’s 
educational mission safely and effectively.101 
 Lower courts typically apply the four major Supreme Court prece-
dents addressed in Part I to specific kinds of student speech in schools: 
(1) the 1986 case of Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser governs “vulgar 
and obscene speech,” (2) the 1988 case of Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier governs “school-sponsored” speech, (3) the 2007 case of Morse 
v. Frederick governs drug-related messages, and (4) the 1969 case of Tink-
 
ol officials 
muc nt speech outside of curricular activities). 
83. 
84 U.S. at 273. 
te 23, at 728. 
94 See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 825–26; Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1030. 
95 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; see al-
so Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 825–26 (arguing that courts should afford scho
h less deference to regulate stude
96 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 6
97 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 409. 
98 See Hazelwood, 4
99 See id. at 271. 
100 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
101 See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 825–26; Hafen, supra no
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er v. Des Moines Independent Community School District governs all other 
student speech.102 Notwithstanding these general classifications, it is not 
always clear how courts choose which standard to apply.103 The choice 
of rule may be particularly important because, often, the main doctrinal 
issue in extracurricular student speech cases is whether the school has 
the burden of demonstrating that disruption (or the reasonable forecast 
thereof) justifies the speech restriction, or whether the burden instead 
rests with students to show that a speech restriction constitutes an abuse 
of institutional discretion.104 Outside specific instances involving speech 
governed by Fraser or Morse, courts generally apply either the Tinker dis-
ruption standard to individual student expression, or the Hazelwood le-
gitimate pedagogical concern test to school-sponsored speech in “ex-
p
sponsored,” student speech in extracurricular “expressive” contexts 
ressive” activities.105 
A. Student Speech in School-Sponsored “Expressive” Extracurricular Activities 
 In cases involving student speech in the context of school-
sponsored, extracurricular, “expressive” activities that take place out-
side the classroom, courts tend to apply the Hazelwood standard, hold-
ing that schools may regulate speech if the restriction is reasonably re-
lated to legitimate, pedagogical concerns.106 Cases involving “school-
                                                                                                                      
102 See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2007). 
103 See Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852, 855 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011) (applying both Tinker and Hazelwood); Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 
6J, 4
town Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying both Tinker and Fraser). 
ed to add a public concern requirement to the traditional student speech 
ana nth Circuit would add a fourth category under 
Mor
67 F.3d 755, 765 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying Tinker without discussion as to why this stan-
dard applies among available student speech standards); Wildman ex rel. Wildman v. Mar-
shall
104 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–73 (1988); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–14 (1969); Hafen, supra note 23, at 722–
23. 
105 See Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98, 114 (D. 
Mass. 2003). Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 2007 in Morse v. Frederick, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly classified student speech into (1) the nar-
row category of vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech restricted or punished 
under Fraser; (2) school-sponsored speech governed by Hazelwood; and (3) all other speech 
that falls outside of these categories governed by Tinker. See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 588 (fram-
ing Supreme Court student speech precedents similarly); Pinard, 467 F.3d at 765 (citing 
Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Lowery, 497 
F.3d at 602 (Gilman, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that the Supreme Court in 
Morse declin
lysis under Tinker). Presumably, the Ni
se for speech that advocates illegal drug use. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–
97 (2007). 
106 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 273. 
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have arisen out of student participation in a school newspaper107 or a 
student government campaign in which student speech occurs outside 
of the classroom but in a school-sponsored setting.108 
cle’s content, the district superintendent halted its publica-
on.
1. Identifying a Legitimate, Pedagogical Concern 
 In applying Hazelwood’s legitimate pedagogical concern standard 
to student speech in school-sponsored “expressive” activities, courts 
may consider various factors concerning the degree of control that the 
school as a government institution exercises over the activity and its 
relatedness to the curriculum.109 In 2004, in Dean v. Utica Community 
Schools, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held 
that a public school district violated a student’s First Amendment 
speech rights when school officials censored an article that the student 
had written for publication in the high school’s student-run newspaper, 
the Arrow.110 Student journalist Katy Dean and a fellow staff member 
conducted research for a story about a lawsuit pending against the 
school district, involving a claim by community members that diesel 
fumes from idling buses in the district’s bus garage constituted a nui-
sance that violated their privacy and harmed their health.111 Based on 
the arti
ti 112 
                                                                                                                      
107 See, e.g., Desilets v. Clearview Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 630 A.2d 333, 338, 340 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1993) (finding that Hazelwood applies to a broad set of “curricular” activities, 
but that the school’s pedagogical interests only extended so far as the style and content of 
the school newspaper, and that school officials violated the student journalist’s First 
Amendment rights in censoring reviews of R-rated movies). 
108 See, e.g., Henerey ex rel. Henerey v. City of St. Charles, Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 1128, 
1132–33 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that student’s distribution of condoms attached to stick-
ers bearing his campaign slogan, “Adam Henerey: The Safe Choice,” constituted school-
sponsored speech that occurred in a nonpublic forum); Dean v. Utica Cmty. Sch., 345 F. 
Supp. 2d 799, 806, 813–14 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding that school-sponsored, extracur-
ricular student newspaper constituted a limited public forum, that suppression of an arti-
cle in the newspaper was unconstitutional, and that, even if the newspaper was not a public 
forum, suppression was unreasonable). See generally Sara Prose, Note, Dean v. Utica Com-
munity Schools: A Significant Victory for the Student Press Community and a Potential Guiding 
Force to the Reexamination of the Hazelwood Holding, 87 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 247 (2010) 
(analyzing the federal district court’s decision in Dean). Courts do not consistently apply 
Hazelwood to student newspaper and yearbook cases. See Brownstein, supra note 83, at 746. 
109 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 273; Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 809–10. 
110 345 F. Supp. 2d at 814. 
111 Id. at 802. 
112 Id. at 803. Although the litigation had been discussed at a school board meeting 
and covered in the local newspaper, the principal informed the faculty advisor to the Arrow 
that it would be inappropriate for the student newspaper to run an article on the subject. 
Id. at 802–03. 
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 Dean highlights three issues central to applying Hazelwood to 
school-sponsored, “expressive” extracurricular activities: (1) the type of 
forum, (2) the reasonableness that the speech might be construed to 
bear the school’s imprimatur, and (3) the reasonableness of the view 
that the restriction is related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.113 In 
applying Hazelwood, the district court in Dean analyzed both the type of 
forum and a combination of factors related to the degree of institu-
tional control over the Arrow to determine whether the superinten-
dent’s censorship reflected a legitimate, pedagogical concern.114 The 
ur
ver the subjects or content of newspaper ar-
cle
                                                                                                                     
co t held that the Arrow was a limited public forum that had been 
opened for use by the public for speech related to matters of concern 
to the Utica High School community.115 
 The court applied six “intent factors” from Hazelwood, plus three 
factors used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, includ-
ing school policy and practice with respect to the forum, and the na-
ture of the property at issue and its compatibility with expressive activ-
ity.116 The six factors from Hazelwood were: (1) whether students pro-
duced the newspaper as part of the school curriculum, (2) whether 
students received credits and grades for completing the course, (3) 
whether a faculty member oversaw the newspaper’s production, (4) 
whether the school deviated from its policy of producing the newspa-
per as part of the curriculum, (5) whether the administration or faculty 
advisor exercised control o
ti s, and (6) whether the board of education had applicable written 
policies for student publications to indicate that a student publication 
was not a public forum.117 
 
113 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–73; Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 805–06; Brownstein, su-
pra note 83, at 770–73, 775–76. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s framework for 
defining the type of forum applicable in a First Amendment speech case, see supra note 
83. For a discussion of the Dean court’s forum analysis, see infra note 115. 
114 See Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 805–06. 
115 Id. at 806. The court reasoned that Hazelwood does not apply if a school-sponsored 
publication constitutes a limited public forum in which the government may impose only 
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations, and in instances in which content-based 
regulations must be narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling state interest. See id. at 805 
(citing Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 354 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that uni-
versity yearbook was a limited public forum)); see also Brownstein, supra note 83, at 770–77 
(providing an analysis of forum doctrine applied to school-sponsored activities under Ha-
zelwood and describing the inconsistencies in the use of forum analysis in student speech 
cases and the difficulties in applying the legitimate pedagogical concern test due to the 
broad range of justifications it permits). 
116 Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 807. 
117 Id. at 807–08. 
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 The court in Dean found that the first of these six “intent factors” 
favored protecting student speech because the students produced the 
Arrow as part of the school curriculum, received credits and grades for 
their participation, and were supervised by a faculty member.118 As to 
the fourth factor, however, the school district deviated from its policy of 
producing the newspaper as an exclusively curricular activity because 
the district repeatedly encouraged students to take the class for credit, 
as an extracurricular activity.119 Further, the district delegated editorial 
control in practice to the student staff of the Arrow.120 The school’s writ-
ten policies, the Arrow’s masthead, and the broad distribution in the 
community also contributed to the court’s determination that the Ar-
row constituted a limited public forum subject to heightened judicial 
scrutiny.121 Finally, the court drew on the newspaper’s educational pur-
ose
erceived to be 
dent author’s reporting from the official position of the school dis-
trict.127 The court held that the article did not bear the imprimatur of 
                                                                                                                     
p , reasoning that the decision to publish Katy Dean’s article was 
“consistent with the traditions of the paper and the inherent nature of 
newspaper journalism in a democracy.”122 
 The district court in Dean also held that, even if the Arrow consti-
tuted a nonpublic forum, suppressing the articles did not meet the Ha-
zelwood legitimate pedagogical concern test because it was not reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.123 According to the court, 
the school district’s arguments that the student’s article lacked factual 
accuracy and was biased were unsupported.124 Further, among other po-
tential objections, the court reasoned that the article did not raise privacy 
concerns; it did not contain sexual content that might be p
inappropriate for immature audiences; the reporting was fair and bal-
anced; the article could have been revised; and the article’s grammar, 
writing quality, and accuracy met journalistic standards.125 
 The Court in Dean concluded that the district superintendent sup-
pressed the article because she disagreed with the content expressed 
therein.126 The article contained a disclaimer, disassociating the stu-
 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 807–08. 
120 Id. at 808. 
121 See id. at 807–09. 
122 Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 809. 
123 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 809. 
124 Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 809 n.4, 813. 
125 Id. at 810–12. 
126 Id. at 813. 
127 Id. 
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the school because no reasonable reader would conclude that the dis-
trict endorsed the viewpoints expressed by subjects that students inter-
iew
he restriction is reasonably related 
to a legitimate pedagogical concern.132 
H
                                                                                                                     
v ed for the Arrow article.128 
 Dean demonstrates the variety of factors that a court might con-
sider in applying Hazelwood to student speech in school-sponsored, “ex-
pressive” extracurricular activities.129 Dean also highlights the three 
main questions raised in applying Hazelwood to extracurricular student 
speech: (1) the nature of the forum, (2) the reasonableness of the rela-
tionship between the restriction and a legitimate, pedagogical concern, 
and (3) the reasonableness that the speech might be construed to bear 
the school’s imprimatur.130 If the school district had exercised greater 
control over the Arrow, it might have met Hazelwood’s imprimatur stan-
dard.131 Although the district court in Dean held that the newspaper 
was a limited public forum where school officials exercise limited con-
trol over student speech, in other cases school officials may still censor 
student speech in similar activities if t
2. azelwood Applied in Student Government Cases 
 Outside the newspaper context where the analogue to Hazelwood 
may be more obvious,133 courts sometimes apply Hazelwood’s legitimate 
pedagogical concern test to student government election activities.134 
For example, in 1999, in Henerey ex rel. Henerey v. City of St. Charles, School 
District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed stu-
dent speech rights in an “expressive” extracurricular activity that it con-
cluded constituted a nonpublic forum.135 The case concerned the free 
speech rights of a student participating in a high school election cam-
paign for junior class president.136 On the morning of the election, 
 
128 Id. 
129 See id. at 807. 
130 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267–69, 271, 273. 
131 See id. at 273; Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 813. 
132 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 809. 
133 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 809–10. 
134 See Henerey, 200 F.3d at 1132–33; Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 
1989); see also Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 47, 50–52 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying Tinker 
to student online speech criticizing school administration for which a student was pun-
ished by not being permitted to run for class secretary, and holding that school officials 
could reasonably forecast that the student speech would be substantially disruptive under 
Tinker). 
135 200 F.3d at 1133. 
136 Id. at 1132–33. 
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Adam Henerey, a candidate for junior class president, distributed con-
doms attached to stickers bearing his campaign slogan, “Adam Henerey: 
The Safe Choice.”137 Although a later count revealed that Henerey won 
the election, the school principal barred him from taking office due to 
olely because the restriction dis-
school’s speech.143 The difference in results in such cases seems to rest 
     
complaints about the distribution of condoms.138 
 The Eighth Circuit stated that the election constituted a nonpublic 
forum because the election was not opened to the public, and because 
the school demonstrated intent to control speech associated with the 
election—the school required candidates to sign an agreement to obey 
school rules and to obtain prior approval before distributing campaign 
materials.139 The Eighth Circuit also held that the election was a school-
sponsored activity “that was part of the school’s curriculum” because it 
was operated by school administration; therefore, members of the pub-
lic could reasonably conclude that distribution of campaign materials 
was approved by the school and that the election had a pedagogical 
purpose.140 The court concluded that regulating distribution of con-
doms thus served the school’s legitimate, pedagogical interest “in di-
vorcing its extracurricular programs from controversial and sensitive 
topics, such as teenage sex . . . .”141 This conclusion demonstrates how 
the pedagogical concern and imprimatur functions of Hazelwood may 
be conflated: school officials can claim that a speech restriction inher-
ently serves a pedagogical purpose s
tances the school from the speech.142 
 Decisions like Henerey and Dean ultimately define extracurricular 
activities as part of the curriculum, permitting school officials to restrict 
student speech when the school demonstrates that the speech conflicts 
with a legitimate pedagogical purpose and could be construed as the 
                                                                                                                 
137 Id. at 1131. Henerey distributed fewer than one dozen condoms. Id. 
138 Id. The principal claimed the disqualification was due to Henerey’s failure to com-
ply le requiring prior approval from the school principal or assistant prin-
cipal to distribute materials in the hallways. Id. 
. 695, 702, 699 n.24 (2011) (discussing tension between 
the 
 
with a school ru
139 Id. at 1133. 
140 Id. 
141 Henerey, 200 F.3d at 1135–36. 
142 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271–73; see also Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and 
Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. Rev
government’s ability to promote a particular message as its own and to implement its 
goals for a particular program). 
143 See Henerey, 200 F.3d at 1133 (holding that the election was “a school-sponsored ac-
tivity that was a part of the school’s curriculum”); Poling, 872 F.2d at 762 (“The universe of 
legitimate pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the academic . . . .”); see also 
Cleveland v. Blount Cnty. Sch. Dist. 00050, No. 3:05-CV-380, 2008 WL 250403, at *1, *3–4 
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in part on the type of forum; where a student can demonstrate the exis-
tence of a limited public forum instead of a non-public forum, the 
speech is less likely to be construed as that of the school or as school-
sanctioned.144 Further, the “intent” factors that the district court ap-
plied in Dean addressed the degree of school control, helping to define 
and explain why the speech at issue was not the school’s message.145 
Under Hazelwood’s pedagogical concern test, however, finding that stu-
dent speech in an expressive extracurricular activity is not protected 
effectively equates an extracurricular with a curricular setting.146 
B. On and Off the Playing Field: Student Athletes’ Speech 
 In examining student speech rights in the context of extracurricu-
lar athletics, courts have tended to apply Tinker’s holding that school 
officials may restrict student speech that is substantially disruptive, ra-
ther than the legitimate pedagogical concern test set out in Hazel-
wood.147 In the extracurricular athletics context, courts have empha-
sized the need to maintain order, discipline, and top-down authoritar-
ian structures on sports teams.148 One court has analogized student 
athletes to government employees.149 Other courts, however, have re-
jected this approach.150 
                                                                                                                      
(E.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2008) (finding dissolution of student extracurricular step team due to 
h Circuit Leaves Students’ Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 169, 183–85 
(20
.3d at 1132–33; Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 804, 806; Brownstein, su-
pra 
 249 F.3d at 771–72; 
Sea r. 1996). 
mployee whis-
tleb
 
concerns that the team’s “suggestive dance moves” were inappropriate for the maturity 
level of audiences at basketball games constituted a reasonable restriction based on a valid 
educational purpose). In 1989, in Poling v. Murphy, the Sixth Circuit held that a student’s 
election campaign speech was “speech sponsored by the school and disseminated under its 
auspices.” 872 F.2d at 763. This holding defers to school officials to decide whether a stu-
dent’s speech is consistent with a school’s educational mission or whether the speech is 
likely to cause disruption. See Lynn S. Brackman, Note, High Schools and the First Amendment: 
The Eight
01). 
144 See Henerey, 200 F
note 83, at 771–72. 
145 See Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 810–13. 
146 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73; Poling, 872 F.2d at 762–64. 
147 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 588; Pinard, 467 F.3d at 768–70; Wildman,
mons v. Snow (Seamons I ), 84 F.3d 1226, 1237–38 (10th Ci
148 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 594; Wildman, 249 F.3d at 772. 
149 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 587, 597–600 (describing greater restrictions on student ath-
letes as analogous to greater restrictions on government employees); see also Edmund 
Donnelly, Comment, What Happens When Student-Athletes Are the Ones Who Blow the Whistle?: 
How Lowery v. Euverard Exposes a Deficiency in the First Amendment Rights of Student- Athletes, 
43 New Eng. L. Rev. 943, 963–67 (2009) (proposing adding government e
lower protections to the Tinker disruption standard for student speech). 
150 See Pinard, 467 F.3d at 765 (holding that the public concern test for government 
employee speech set out in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, 
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 Although Tinker only permits school officials to restrict student 
speech that is materially and substantially disruptive, courts frequently 
hinge decisions on a caveat in Tinker; in meeting their burden of proof, 
school officials need not demonstrate that student speech actually 
caused the disruption, but rather that the official can reasonably “forecast 
substantial disruption of or material interference with school activi-
ties.”151 In applying this forecast of disruption standard, courts empha-
size the voluntary nature of extracurricular activities, granting wide def-
erence to school authorities to restrict student speech, even when the 
speech occurs off the field or court, outside of practice or competition, 
and only in communication with other players.152 
1. Public Employee Speech Applied to Student Athletes 
 In recent cases addressing student athletes’ First Amendment 
speech rights, the Sixth Circuit has applied government employee 
speech standards, departing from the position of the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits, which have rejected this approach.153 The voluntary nature of 
student athletics, combined with the government employee speech 
model, may result in conditioning participation in extracurricular ath-
                                                                                                                      
 that courts 
shou
officials to fore-
cast
ably forecast that student speech on a personal blog would be substan-
tiall
 should not be evaluated under speech stan-
dard yees). 
Will County and Connick v. Myers should not be applied in student speech context); Sea-
mons v. Snow (Seamons II ), 206 F.3d 1021, 1030 n.4 (10th Cir. 2000) (implying
ld not apply government employee speech standards to student speech). 
151 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added); Lowery, 497 F.3d at 592 (citing LaVine 
v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001)); Pinard, 467 F.3d at 772 (hold-
ing that basketball players’ petition could not reasonably have led school 
 substantial disruption or material interference with a school activity). 
152 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 599–600; Wildman, 249 F.3d at 772 (holding that the letter 
that the high school basketball player distributed to teammates constituted “insubordinate 
speech toward her coaches,” and distinguishing between speech in the classroom and abil-
ity to play on extracurricular athletic team). But see Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 
1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that schools traditionally exercise more control in curricular 
settings than over extracurricular activities); Romano v. Harrington, 725 F. Supp. 687, 690 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[E]ducators may exercise greater editorial control over what students 
write for class than what they voluntarily submit to an extra-curricular, albeit school-
funded, publication.”). Deference to school officials’ forecast of substantial disruption may 
occur in other contexts as well. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51–53 (holding that school offi-
cials could reason
y disruptive). 
153 Compare Lowery, 497 F.3d at 597–99 (analogizing student athletes to government 
employees), with Pinard, 467 U.S. at 765–67 (holding that the public concern test for gov-
ernment employee speech should not be applied to students), and Seamons II, 206 F.3d at 
1030 n.4 (implying that student speech rights
s applicable to government emplo
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le s on forfeiting the ability to critique the coach or other school au-
thorities.
tic
allos, 
e 
yers who signed the petition but apologized 
                                                                                                                     
154 
 Public employee speech doctrine protects the First Amendment 
speech rights of citizens employed by the government under limited 
circumstances.155 In 1968, in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township 
High School District 205, Will County, the Supreme Court held that public 
employment reduces the employee’s speech rights, and that courts 
must balance an employee’s right against the government’s interest in 
restricting the speech.156 In 1983, in Connick v. Myers, the Supreme 
Court further qualified this standard by adding a “public concern test,” 
requiring that courts consider the “content, form, and context” of the 
speech to determine whether the employee was commenting on a mat-
ter of public concern.157 Most recently, in 2006, in Garcetti v. Ceb
th Supreme Court added another benchmark, holding that a public 
employee’s speech pursuant to “official duties” is not protected.158 
 In 2007, in Lowery v. Euverard, the Sixth Circuit used Tinker’s fore-
cast of disruption standard to characterize student athletes’ speech 
rights as a balance between students’ First Amendment rights and the 
coach’s authority in what the court found to be a public employment-
like setting.159 Public high school football players at Jefferson County 
High School in Tennessee sued the school district and the high 
school’s head football coach, principal, and athletic director after the 
players were dismissed from the football team for signing and circulat-
ing a petition expressing their dissatisfaction with the coach, Marty Eu-
verard.160 The coach discovered the petition and called a team meet-
ing, interviewing the players individually.161 He asked players if they 
had heard about the petition, whether they had signed it, who had 
asked them to sign it, and whether they wanted to play football with 
him as the coach.162 Pla
 
. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
147
75 (1968). 
rs, and requiring a year-round conditioning program 
in vi
urring in the judgment). 
t 586 (majority opinion). 
154 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 597–99. 
155 See Garcetti v
–48 (1983). 
156 391 U.S. 563, 568, 574–
157 461 U.S. at 147–48. 
158 547 U.S. at 421. 
159 See 497 F.3d at 587, 597. 
160 Id. at 585. The petition stated, “I hate Coach Euvard [sic] and I don’t want to play 
for him.” Id. The players objected to Euverard’s coaching methods, including allegedly 
striking a player on the helmet, throwing away college recruiting letters to disfavored play-
ers, humiliating and degrading playe
olation of high school rules. Id. 
161 Id. at 603–04 (Gilman, J., conc
162 Id. a
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we  permitted to remain on the football team; those who refused were 
removed from the team.
re
 need for greater oversight in the athletics context 
lun-
                                                                                                                     
163 
 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that, unlike the classroom, where 
schools train students to be informed citizens in a democracy and to 
appreciate and evaluate competing viewpoints, on the playing field, the 
goal of the team is to win the game, and maintaining the coach’s au-
thority is crucial to achieving this goal.164 The court held that the play-
ers’ petition was not protected speech under the First Amendment be-
cause it threatened team unity and directly challenged the coach’s au-
thority, effects that school officials could reasonably forecast would be 
disruptive.165 The
permitted the school to impose greater restrictions on athletes than on 
other students.166 
 In Lowery, the Sixth Circuit also applied greater speech restrictions 
to the football players on grounds that student athletes are analogous to 
government employees.167 The Sixth Circuit in Lowery compared the 
football players’ petition to the questionnaire that the public employee 
in Connick circulated at work, which asked, among other questions, 
whether employees had confidence in their supervisors.168 In addition 
to holding that the football players’ petition was disruptive because it 
challenged the coach’s authority, the Sixth Circuit also concluded that 
the school, like the government employer in Connick, had a right to re-
strict a voluntary program it administers.169 Student athletes’ participa-
tion on the extracurricular football team, like the choice of government 
employees to work for the government, was voluntary.170 The Sixth Cir-
cuit held that the students retained a right to express views about their 
coach, but not as members of the football team.171 Football was vo
 
f partici-
pati cholastic athletics violated the state constitution). 
9 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148–49, 152, 154). 
o play football 
for e actively working to undermine his authority.”). 
t 599–600. 
163 Id. 
164 See id. at 589. 
165 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 594–96. 
166 See id. at 589 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) 
(holding that student athletes have a lower expectation of privacy than other students and 
that suspicionless random drug testing of student athletes by urinalysis is constitutional)). 
But see York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995, 1006 (Wash. 2008) (holding 
that a school’s warrantless random drug testing of student athletes as condition o
ng in extracurricular inters
167 See 497 F.3d at 597–98. 
168 See id. at 597–9
169 See id. at 599. 
170 See id. at 600 (“What [student athletes] are not free to do is continue t
[Coach Euverard] whil
171 See id. a
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ta  and participation could require abdicating the right to dissent, 
even when the speech occurred outside practice or competition.
ry,
trict court’s holding that the letter substantially 
isru
im in the locker room.177 The Tenth 
er to be “insubordinate 
                                                                                                                     
172 
 Similarly, in 2001, in Wildman ex rel. Wildman v. Marshalltown School 
District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a high 
school basketball player’s letter to her teammates, composed on her 
home computer and distributed on a Saturday in the school’s locker 
room, constituted insubordinate speech that lacked First Amendment 
protection.173 The Eighth Circuit drew on the Fraser standard permit-
ting school officials to punish vulgar expression but also relied on Tink-
er, and affirmed the dis
d pted a school activity.174 The decision leaves unclear which stan-
dard carried the day.175 
 The Eighth Circuit distinguished basketball player Rebecca Wild-
man’s speech from student athlete speech about “egregious con-
duct.”176 A year before, in 2000, in Seamons v. Snow, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had upheld the First Amendment speech 
rights of a football player who was not permitted to play after he re-
fused to apologize for reporting a hazing incident in which fellow 
teammates physically assaulted h
Circuit in Seamons explicitly declined to apply public employee speech 
standards to student athletes.178 
 In Wildman, however, the Eighth Circuit implied that the basket-
ball player’s letter to her teammates would have been protected in the 
context of the kind of egregious conduct revealed by the speech in 
Seamons.179 The Eighth Circuit in Wildman, though not explicitly em-
bracing a government employee speech paradigm, alluded to its appli-
cation in holding the basketball player’s lett
 
the 
bull
 like Wildman’s constituted disruption and would impair the team’s cohesiveness. 
See i
rsing 
the ismiss on the First Amendment claim). 
 n.4. 
172 See id. 
173 See Wildman, 249 F.3d at 772. The letter suggested that some of the sophomore 
players should be playing on the varsity or junior varsity teams. Id. at 770. The letter stated, 
“We as a team have to do something about this,” and “[The coach] needs us next year and 
the year after and what if we aren’t there for him? It is time to give him back some of 
shit that he has given us. . . . We now need to stand up for what we believe in!!!” Id. 
174 See id. at 771. The court seemed to rely on the school district’s argument that 
speech
d. 
175 See id. at 771–72. 
176 See id. at 772 (citing Seamons II, 206 F.3d at 1028). 
177 See Seamons II, 206 F.3d at 1024, 1028 (reversing the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment on the First Amendment claim); Seamons I, 84 F.3d at 1237–38 (reve
district court’s grant of a motion to d
178 Seamons II, 206 F.3d at 1030
179 Wildman, 249 F.3d at 772. 
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speech toward her coaches,” and, absent egregious, whistleblower-type 
circumstances, it was therefore punishable.180 
 Student athletes’ speech may be reduced because speech that chal-
lenges a coach’s authority may be considered disruptive.181 Further-
more, permitting school officials to forecast substantial disruption be-
fore it occurs shifts the burden to students to show that their speech is 
not disruptive, instead of requiring the school official to demonstrate 
hat their coach would be 
ac
o board the bus, how-
                   
that the disruption was substantial.182 
2. Rejections of Public Employee Speech Models 
 In 2006, in Pinard v. Clatskanie School District 6J, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that student athletes’ complaints 
about their basketball coach constituted protected speech under Tinker 
because the speech could not reasonably have prompted school offi-
cials to forecast substantial disruption of a school activity.183 The coach 
was verbally abusive and highly intimidating.184 He told the team he 
would be willing to resign if they requested it.185 Several weeks later, the 
co-captains called a team meeting outside of school, at a local restau-
rant, which all but one varsity player attended.186 The players discussed 
a petition requesting their coach’s resignation, and every player except 
the coach’s son signed it.187 The co-captains delivered the petition to 
the coach the next morning.188 Believing t
co hing the scheduled game at another school that evening, the play-
ers refused to board the bus to the game.189 
 On these facts—similar to those the Sixth Circuit confronted in 
Lowery—the Ninth Circuit held that the petition was pure speech, like 
the armbands in Tinker.190 The students’ refusal t
                                                                                                   
 at 1237–38; see also Donnelly, supra note 149, at 963–67. 
97 F.3d at 597; Wildman, 249 F.3d at 771–72. 
owery, 497 F.3d at 603–04 (Gilman, J., concurring in the judgment). 
d at 759. 
t 760. 
761–62. The players stated that they would not have refused 
to b
764, 768–69. 
180 See id.; Seamons I, 84 F.3d
181 See Lowery, 4
182 See L
183 Pinard, 467 F.3
184 Id. a
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 760–61. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 See Pinard, 467 F.3d at 
oard the bus and play in the game if they had known that a replacement coach had 
been located for that game. Id. at 762. 
190 See id. at 
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e , was punishable as substantially disruptive of a school program— 
hosting and organizing extracurricular events.
ver
n applied in 
analogous relationships between the government and individuals, the 
court
 
                                                                                                                     
191 
 The Ninth Circuit in Pinard also explicitly rejected comparisons to 
government employee speech.192 The court explained that the district 
court’s use of the Connick public concern test—that the complaints 
against the coach were a private matter and therefore not protected— 
demonstrates a misapplication of Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 
precedents.193 Although the public concern test has bee
 observed no such similarity in the school context.194 
C. “Tinker”ing with School-Sponsorship: Two Standards Combined 
 Although courts tend to apply Hazelwood to student speech in “in-
herently expressive” school-sponsored extracurricular activities and 
Tinker to student athletes’ speech, the choice of standard is not always 
clear.195 The distinction between school-sponsored speech and individ-
ual speech, however, seems to imply that Hazelwood and Tinker are mu-
tually exclusive standards—the Tinker disruption standard generally
applies if the speech is not school-sponsored and thus falls outside of 
the Hazelwood legitimate pedagogical concern and imprimatur tests.196 
 In 2010, in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Silsbee Independent School District, how-
ever, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied elements of 
both Tinker and Hazelwood in determining that cheerleader H.S.’s re-
fusal to cheer individually for a student who assaulted her was not pro-
tected speech.197 The court implied that cheerleading constituted a 
school-sponsored expressive activity that might reasonably be perceived 
to bear the school’s imprimatur under Hazelwood, perhaps because H.S. 
and the other cheerleaders wore the school uniform or because their 
 
5, 769. The court did not reach the question of whether the “boy-
cott” was expressive in nature because it held this conduct disruptive under Tinker. See id. 
at 7
dard carried the day or if the standards may be combined); Doe, 402 F. 
App
e Eighth Circuit in Wildman did not elucidate which standard—Tinker or 
Fras
 at 855. 
191 See id. at 764–6
65, 769–70. 
192 Id. at 765–67. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 766 n.16. 
195 See Wildman, 249 F.3d at 771 (applying both Tinker and Fraser without explicitly spe-
cifying which stan
’x at 855; see also Lowery, 497 F.3d at 604 (Gilman, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(noting that th
er—applied). 
196 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; Brownstein, supra note 
83, at 823–24. 
197 See 402 F. App’x
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cheers clearly identified them with the school and its athletic pro-
gram.198 Further, cheerleading could be characterized as part of the 
curriculum under Hazelwood because the team was supervised by a 
coach hired by the school and because cheerleading was an activity “de-
signed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants 
and audiences.”199 The Fifth Circuit concluded that “allowing [H.S.] to 
cheer or not cheer, as she saw fit” —that is, not punishing H.S. by re-
ov
t in extracurricular set-
m ing her from the squad—would have been promoting her expres-
sive conduct, not simply tolerating it.200 
 The Fifth Circuit also applied Tinker’s disruption standard, holding 
that H.S.’s choice not to cheer for Rakheem Bolton individually consti-
tuted “substantial interference with the work of the school.”201 The 
court reasoned that school officials could punish H.S. because she at-
tended the basketball game voluntarily, “for the purpose of cheering,” 
but the decision does not further explain why H.S.’s silence was disrup-
tive.202 Furthermore, although school officials generally retain greater 
control over curricular content than conten
tings,203 here, as in Lowery and Wildman, the voluntary nature of the 
activity weighed against H.S.’s speech rights.204 
 The Fifth Circuit thus applied both Tinker and Hazelwood, an ap-
proach which implies that individual student speech in an extracurricu-
lar activity, normally evaluated under Tinker as either disruptive or not, 
might also become school-sponsored speech under Hazelwood.205 The 
short opinion in Doe did not specify under what circumstances both 
standards together might apply to student speech, but the court’s de-
scription of H.S.’s role on the team may be informative.206 In Doe, the 
Fifth Circuit reasoned that H.S.’s choice to join the cheerleading squad 
in the first place imposed a contractual obligation to cheer for a par-
                                                                                                                      
198 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271; Doe, 402 F. App’x at 855. The court did not explain 
the factual basis for its conclusion that H.S. was a “mouthpiece” for her school. See Doe, 402 
F. A
; Doe, 402 F. App’x at 855. 
. App’x at 855. 
at they voluntarily submit to an extra-curricular, albeit school-
fund
owery, 497 F.3d at 597; Wildman, 249 F.3d at 771–72. 
. App’x at 855. 
pp’x at 855. 
199 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271
200 See Doe, 402 F
201 See id. 
202 See id. 
203 See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289 (“[E]ducational institutions have traditionally ex-
ercised greater control over curriculum than over extracurricular activities.”); Romano, 725 
F. Supp. at 690 (“[E]ducators may exercise greater editorial control over what students 
write for class than wh
ed, publication.”). 
204 Doe, 402 F. App’x at 855; see L
205 See Doe, 402 F
206 See id. 
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ticular player.207 The court, concluding that H.S. “served as a mouth-
piece through which [the school district] could disseminate speech— 
of determining which school restrictions are “reasona-
          
namely, support for its athletic teams,” compared a student to a public 
employee compelled to convey the government’s message instead of 
evaluating the student’s speech as that of a participant in an extracur-
ricular activity with educational goals.208 
 Lower courts tend to apply Hazelwood to school-sponsored, “ex-
pressive” extracurricular activities like a student newspaper or student 
government elections because such activities are supervised by faculty, 
intended to impart particular knowledge or skills, and reasonably 
might be construed to be the school’s message or one approved by it.209 
In the context of extracurricular athletics, however, courts tend to ap-
ply Tinker’s disruption standard but may rely heavily on school officials’ 
claims that they reasonably forecasted substantial disruption.210 In de-
ferring to school officials, one court has explicitly relied on public em-
ployee speech analogies in addition to the voluntary nature of extra-
curricular activities to uphold the choice to suppress or punish student 
athletes’ expression.211 In Doe, the Fifth Circuit applied both Tinker and 
Hazelwood, though either standard might support the opposite result.212 
 The First Amendment concern in applying either Tinker or Hazel-
wood is that the government actor—the school—might suppress or pun-
ish student speech solely out of disapproval of its content, not for edu-
cational purposes.213 Scholars have addressed what it means for a 
school activity to be “school-sponsored” and have proposed resolutions 
to the problem 
                                                                                                            
208 See Doe, 402 F. App’x at 855; see also Lowery, 497 F.3d at 597; infra notes 254–262 and 
acco ricular activities). 
 silence during a player’s foul 
sho d discipline of the school,” 
whe
’x at 855. 
9. 
207 See id. at 853; see also Lowery, 497 F.3d at 597; Wildman, 249 F.3d at 771–72. 
mpanying text (discussing the educational value of extracur
209 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271; Henerey, 200 F.3d at 1133; Dean, 345 F. Supp. at 810–
13. 
210 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 596; Wildman, 249 F.3d at 771–72. 
211 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 597–99; id. at 605 (Gilman, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Pinard, 467 F.3d at 766–67, 767 n. 18; Doe, 402 F. App’x at 853, 855. 
212 See Doe, 402 F. App’x at 855. Unlike the student election campaign speech in Hene-
rey, a reasonable observer likely would have seen H.S.’s silence as her own individual 
speech and not speech bearing the school’s imprimatur under Hazelwood. See Hazelwood, 
484 U.S. at 271; Henerey, 200 F.3d at 1135; Doe, 402 F. App’x at 855. Alternatively, the Fifth 
Circuit might have concluded that a single cheerleader’s
ts did not “materially and substantially disrupt the work an
ther defined as the basketball game as a whole or as the activities of the cheerleading 
squad. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513; Doe, 402 F. App
213 See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 834–35, 837–3
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bly .214 
The next of a fore-
 officials or each other about their coach 
ts
                                                                                                                     
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” under Hazelwood
Part analyzes the problems with school officials’ use 
cast of disruption standard under Tinker as applied to extracurricular 
student speech.215 
III. Student Participation in Extracurricular Activities 
Jeopardizes Individual Student Speech Rights 
 In student speech cases in extracurricular contexts, courts tend to 
apply the pedagogical concern test that the Supreme Court set out in 
1988 in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier to expressive, school-spon- 
sored speech, and the substantial disruption test that the Court estab-
lished in 1969 in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District to individ-
ual speech.216 Although the choice of standard is not always clear,217 it is 
logical that courts generally would apply Tinker to student athletes 
communicating with school
ou ide of practice or competition because no one would reasonably 
confuse their speech to be the school’s.218 In inherently “expressive” 
extracurricular activities, however, such as a student newspaper, dance 
performance, or government elections, student expression is central to 
the school-sponsored activity.219 
 In these “inherently expressive” extracurricular activities, forum 
analysis often serves as an initial threshold for upholding or denying 
student speech rights because courts give greater deference to the 
school’s ability to control speech in a school-sponsored activity that con-
stitutes a nonpublic forum.220 A conclusion that the activity is school-
sponsored and constitutes a nonpublic forum thus effectively equates 
 
arshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying both 
Tink
 (2011) (applying both Tinker 
and 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; Lowery v. Euverard, 
497 
lwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71; Henerey ex rel. Henerey v. City of St. Charles, Sch. 
Dist
70–72. 
214 See Brownstein, supra note 83, at 734–36, 784–87; Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 
834–35; Waldman, supra note 62, at 66, 112–13. 
215 See infra notes 232–254 and accompanying text. 
216 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969). 
217 See Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 765 (9th Cir. 2006); Wildman ex 
rel. Wildman v. M
er and Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser); Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. 
App’x 852, 855 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2875
Hazelwood). 
218 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271–73; 
F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2007); Wildman, 249 F.3d at 770. 
219 See Haze
., 200 F.3d 1128, 1133 (8th Cir. 1999). 
220 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267, 269; Henerey, 200 F.3d at 1133; Brownstein, supra note 
83, at 7
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extracurricular activities with the curricular setting.221 In 2004, in Dean 
v. Utica Community Schools, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
f M
etics context, Tinker’s forecast 
 d
with applying the forecast of disruption standard to punish student 
                                                                                                                     
o ichigan used multiple factors derived from Hazelwood to determine 
whether the school’s asserted pedagogical concerns proved legiti-
mate.222 This fact-intensive analysis of the pedagogical purpose for sup-
pressing or punishing extracurricular student speech helps to ensure 
that the school’s exercise of control over its own message does not in-
fringe student speech.223 
 Unlike student speech in inherently expressive extracurricular ac-
tivities, speech cases of student athletes tend to involve individual stu-
dents speaking outside of the activity itself.224 For example, in 2007, in 
Lowery v. Euverard, Judge Ronald Gilman, concurring in the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, noted that no disruption of 
the football team occurred until Coach Euverard discovered the stu-
dent athletes’ petition and called a team meeting in response, inter-
viewing players individually.225 In the athl
of isruption standard permits school officials to restrict student ath-
letes’ individual speech made outside practice or competition and 
communicated primarily to other students or to relevant school offi-
cials.226 In these cases, a forecast that speech outside of practice or 
competition will be disruptive may result in punishment within the ac-
tivity, such as removal from the team.227 
 This Note argues that the forecast of disruption standard condi-
tions participation in extracurricular activities on forfeiting speech 
rights.228 Section III.A outlines the doctrinal and practical problems 
 
221 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271–73; Henerey, 200 F.3d at 1133. 
when the 
stud f the school,” or (2) when it 
“ch ce.” See id. 
467 F.3d at 760–61. 
e student petition was substantially 
disr hority); Wildman, 249 F.3d at 772. 
222 See 345 F. Supp. 2d 799, 810–13 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 
271). 
223 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–72; Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 810–13. One author has 
suggested that Hazelwood was designed for and should only apply to restrictions on school-
sponsored speech, using a sliding scale approach. See Waldman, supra note 62, at 112–13. 
Under this approach, school officials’ decisions to suppress or punish student speech 
would enjoy greater deference when public perception that the speech bears the school’s 
imprimatur is strongest. See id. For example, the author presents two situations in which 
deference is strongest, on the higher end of this “imprimatur spectrum”: (1) 
ent speech “changes the permanent physical appearance o
anges the nature of other students’ substantive classroom experien
224 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585; Pinard, 
225 497 F.3d at 603–04 (Gilman, J., concurring in the judgment). 
226 See id.; Pinard, 467 F.3d at 760–61. 
227 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 593–94 (reasoning that th
uptive because it directly challenged the coach’s aut
228 See infra notes 232–254 and accompanying text. 
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speech in extracurricular contexts.229 Section III.B demonstrates that 
using the forecast of disruption standard to punish student speech 
about extracurricular activities contradicts the educational purpose of 
schools miting 
the scope of Tinker’s f tandard as applied to 
officials demonstrate substantial disruption.236 Al-
                                          
and extracurricular activities.230 Section III.C proposes li
orecast of disruption s
speech punished in extracurricular contexts to ensure a close connec-
tion between speech restrictions and educational goals.231 
A. Forecast of Disruption Standard Conditions Participation  
on Reduced Speech Rights 
 School officials’ use of a forecast of disruption standard to sup-
press or punish student speech in extracurricular activities frequently 
erodes student speech rights.232 Applying this standard to student ath-
letes’ speech that takes place off the playing field and addressed to oth-
er students or school officials creates a chilling effect on student speech 
because it provides unclear or no notice of what speech may be re-
stricted.233 Furthermore, it also shifts the burden from school officials 
to students to demonstrate that their speech would not have caused 
disruption.234 Unlike inherently expressive extracurricular activities in 
which the school’s own message is at issue, use of the forecast of disrup-
tion standard may condition individual student athletes’ participation 
in extracurricular athletics on accepting reduced individual speech 
rights.235 This result directly contradicts Tinker’s holding that student 
speech rights extend beyond classroom hours to the playing field ex-
cept when school 
though one might expect school control over student speech to de-
crease with lessening curriculum-relatedness, thus resulting in greater 
student speech rights, recent case law establishes the opposite: students 
                                                                            
otes 271–289 and accompanying text. 
29–30. 
azelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 
600;
229 See infra notes 232–254 and accompanying text. 
230 See infra notes 255–270 and accompanying text. 
231 See infra n
232 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 596. 
233 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 691 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585, 596; Wildman, 249 F.3d at 771–72; Waldman, supra note 76, at 
1114, 11
234 Lowery, 497 F.3d at 603 (Gilman, J., concurring in the judgment). 
235 See H
 Wildman, 249 F.3d at 772; Seamons v. Snow (Seamons I ), 84 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 
1996). 
236 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 603 (Gilman, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
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may actually lose speech rights because of their participation in extracur-
ricular activities.237 
 The forecast of disruption standard erodes student speech rights 
in two major ways.238 First, it restricts a student’s individual right to 
speak critically about a school program, even if it is simply in a discus-
sion among teammates outside of the activity itself—that is, outside of 
rac
t to matter nearly as much as 
e 
school officials to punish student speech on grounds that questioning 
authority is itself inherently disruptive.243 
     
p tice or competition.239 Second, applying the forecast of disruption 
presents a notice problem because it will be difficult for a student ath-
lete to know in advance whether a petition against an abusive coach will 
be treated as whistleblower-like reporting of egregious conduct or, al-
ternatively, as an insubordinate complaint and threat to authority.240 
 Part of the problem lies in the fact that the possibility of applying 
the forecast of disruption standard extends to all aspects of the stu-
dent’s time in school—beyond practice and the playing field— particu-
larly if disruption is characterized as a challenge to authority.241 The 
location or context of the speech seems no
th content of the speech, particularly whether the speech is construed 
as a challenge to authority.242 Applying the forecast of disruption stan-
dard to students participating in extracurricular activities thus permits 
                                                                                                                 
237 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 845–47 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Lo-
wery
y, 497 F.3d at 593–94, 596; Wildman, 249 F.3d at 770, 772; Seamons v. Snow 
(Sea
n Wildman ex rel. Wildman v. Marshalltown School District, the Eighth 
Circ
(2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting a stu-
dent
, 497 F.3d at 597. 
238 See Lower
mons II ), 206 F.3d 1021, 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 2000). 
239 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585, 593–94; Pinard, 467 F.3d at 
760–61, 772; Wildman, 249 F.3d at 770, 772. 
240 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 596; Wildman, 249 F.3d at 772; Seamons II, 206 F.3d at 1024, 
1028. 
241 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585–86, 596; Waldman, supra note 
76, at 1129–30. 
242 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585. In Lowery, football players planned to bring a petition 
critical of their coach to the attention of school officials only after the season concluded. 
Id. In addition, in 2001, i
uit focused its analysis almost exclusively on the text of a basketball player’s letter to 
her teammates distributed in the locker room outside of practice and competition. 249 
F.3d at 771–72; accord Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 53 
’s First Amendment claim on grounds that the student web blog post, written off cam-
pus and outside school hours, created foreseeable risk of substantial disruption); see also 
Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1056–64, 1090–92 (arguing against a territorial approach to 
digital student speech). 
243 See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 53; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 594 (“[The petition] was a direct 
challenge to [Coach] Euverard’s authority, and undermined his ability to lead the team. It 
could have no other effect.”); Wildman, 249 F.3d at 771–72. 
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 This standard relies on an attenuated connection between indi-
vidual student speech and its potential disruption; its broad reach is 
also one reason why analogies to public employment are inapt.244 Once 
one chooses to work for the government, one gives up certain rights.245 
Participation in student extracurricular activities—athletics included— 
however, does not create the same kind of individual identity in relation 
to the government.246 As Section III.B addresses, the educational mis-
sion of extracurricular activities involves precisely the ability to try out 
different identities.247 Student athletes ideally each have a variety of 
les
ected in Dean could criticize school dis-
ict
ro —students, athletes, perhaps also debate team members, actors, or 
artists—but the forecast of disruption standard can impose one role at 
all times, reducing speech rights as a result.248 
 Further, use of the forecast of disruption standard reduces stu-
dents’ speech protections off the playing field,249 whereas students par-
ticipating in a limited public forum expressive activity may express the 
same opinions through their activity absent a legitimate pedagogical 
concern for suppressing it.250 Student journalists engaged in the kind 
of investigative reporting prot
tr  administrators but, absent reporting of “egregious” conduct, stu-
dent athletes’ criticism of coaches has been punished under the fore-
cast of disruption standard.251 
 Reliance on the forecast of disruption thus results in conditioning 
participation in extracurricular athletics on accepting reduced speech 
rights compared to other individual students’ rights and compared with 
                                                                                                                      
244 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 602–03 (Gilman, J., concurring in the judgment). Judge Ro-
nald Gilman compared Lowery to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision a few months before 
in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). Id. at 601–02. He argued that the school’s as-
serted interests in Lowery in protecting the coach from challenges to his authority did not 
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damentally different from public employees, and the government’s inter-
ests  n.16. 
); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
147–
ey, 200 F.3d at 1133 (holding that a student 
elec
, 497 F.3d at 597, 599–600; Wildman, 249 F.3d at 772; Seamons II, 206 F.3d 
at 1
justify the restriction on speech in the way that preventing illegal drug use justified the 
restriction in Morse. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 602; see Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. This Note suggests
ther reason why the analogy is inappropriate: students participating in extracurricular 
activities are fun
 are also different. See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 601–03; Pinard, 467 F.3d at 765–66, 766
245 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006
48 (1983). 
246 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421; see infra notes 255–270 and accompanying text. 
247 See infra notes 255–270 and accompanying text. 
248 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 599–600; Wildman, 249 F.3d at 772; 
Waldman, supra note 76, at 1129–30; infra notes 255–270 and accompanying text. 
249 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 599–600. 
250 See Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 810; cf. Hener
tion was a nonpublic forum, a school-sponsored activity, and part of the curriculum). 
251 See Lowery
024, 1028; Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 806–09. 
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students involved in some expressive school-sponsored activities.252 Do-
ing so on grounds that the activity is voluntary—like public employ-
ment—compels students to choose between constitutional speech pro-
t
atio
ties and associate with others who have similar interests or beliefs.261 
Fur
                                                                                               
ection and an essential element of education.253 This analytical combi-
n n—using the Tinker forecast of disruption standard and analogiz-
ing to public employment—undercuts both the educational mission of 
schools, which is generally the reason for restricting student speech, and 
the educational goals of extracurricular activities.254 
B. Voluntary, Extracurricular Activities Serve an Essential Role in Education 
 Applying the forecast of disruption standard to individual student 
speech about extracurricular athletics outside of the context of practice 
or competition conflicts with the school’s educational mission.255 As 
discussed in Section III.A, the effect is to compel a choice between con-
stitutional rights and participation in extracurricular activities central 
to the life of the school and students’ development.256 
 Participation in extracurricular activities is an essential element of 
education.257 Students derive high levels of satisfaction from participat-
ing in extracurricular activities, and participation in turn increases 
their overall satisfaction in school.258 Further, extracurricular activities 
also improve students’ education; participation in extracurricular ac-
tivities correlates with higher likelihood of staying in school and higher 
grades.259 On a practical level, there are some skills that students can 
learn only by participating in extracurricular activities.260 The voluntary 
nature of extracurricular activities also contributes to the value of par-
ticipation by providing a way for students to “try out” different identi-
thermore, participation in extracurricular activities may not be en-
                       
3 (Gilman, J., concurring in 
the 
anta Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311–12 (2000); Lowery, 497 F.3d 
at 5 f of Amici Curiae American Academy of Pediatrics et al. at 8–9, Earls, 536 
U.S -322); supra notes 232–254 and accompanying text. 
252 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 596–97, 599–600; Seamons I, 84 F.3d at 1236; Dean, 345 F. 
Supp. 2d at 810. 
253 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 845–46; Waldman, supra note 76, at 1129–30. 
254 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 601–03 (Gilman, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
255 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 601–0
judgment). 
256 See S
99–600; Brie
. 822 (No. 01
257 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 845–46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
258 Brief of Amici Curiae American Academy of Pediatrics et al., supra note 256, at 8–9. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at 8. 
261 Id. at 9. 
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tirely voluntary because it is essentially required for admission to col-
lege.262 Just as the Supreme Court’s decision in 2002 in Board of Educa-
n 
tive journalism upheld in Dean pro-
de
based regulation, a fact that has been used to support restricting student 
athletes’ constitutional rights in the Fourth Amendment context.268 In-
dee  bod-
tio v. Earls broadly conditions participation in extracurricular activities 
on giving up Fourth Amendment rights, conditioning participation on 
reduced speech rights forces students to “choose” between engaging in 
a central part of the educational experience and speech.263 
 Further, honing students’ ability to critique authority in a con-
structive manner, within the school’s own “marketplace of ideas,” is it-
self educational.264 The investiga
vi s one example.265 In other cases involving student speech in school-
sponsored, inherently expressive activities, educational purposes—and 
the school’s ability to control its own message—may require suppres-
sion or punishment of speech.266 
 Finally, preserving students’ ability to criticize a coach off the field 
to other students or school officials also may serve an important safety 
function in reporting egregious conduct and dangerous conditions.267 
Extracurricular athletic activities are generally subject to greater safety-
d, participation in extracurricular athletics may involve greater
                                                                                                                      
262 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 845–46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Participation . . . [is] essen-
tial in reality for students applying to college. . . . Students ‘volunteer’ for extracurricular 
pursuits in the same way they might volunteer for honors classes: They subject themselves 
to additional requirements, but they do so in order to take full advantage of the education 
offe
 See, e.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989) (dealing with a student 
pun
red them.”). 
263 See id.; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14; Waldman, supra note 76, at 1129–31. 
264 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; Chemerinksy, supra note 26, at 835–36. 
265 See Dean, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 810–13. 
266
ished for a student government election speech which was previously vetted for inap-
propriate content and in which he subsequently added language ridiculing a school offi-
cial); see also Blocher, supra note 37, at 829 (arguing that courts should defer to govern-
ment officials in government institutions only to the extent that speech restrictions con-
tribute to the marketplace of ideas). 
267 See Seamons I, 84 F.3d at 1237; see also Pinard, 467 F.3d at 768–69 (comparing a bas-
ketball players’ non-disruptive petition with the facts of Seamons and finding that the stu-
dent speech in both cases “‘was responsibly tailored to the audience of school administra-
tors . . . who needed to know about the incident’” (quoting Seamons I, 84 F.3d at 1237–
38)). 
268 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 846 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg compared interscholastic athletics to employment in closely regulated industries 
to justify greater intrusions into student athletes’ privacy in the Fourth Amendment con-
text, but she would not have extended the school’s ability to conduct random drug testing 
to permit drug testing students involved in other extracurricular activities. See id. 
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ily risk to students than other extracurricular activities.269 Protecting 
robust speech rights in extracurricular contexts thus not only serves es-
sential educational functions of schools; speech protections also pre-
serve a crucial means of reporting abuse or dangerous conduct.270 
C. Connecting th  Standard to the  
 the educational mission and discouraging the 
e Forecast of Disruption
Educational Mission 
 This Section proposes tailoring the application of the forecast of 
disruption standard in extracurricular contexts to ensure that the sup-
pression or punishment of student speech is closely linked to the edu-
cational goal of the activity.271 This Note contends that the voluntary 
nature of extracurricular activities should not require students to re-
ceive a lower degree of speech protection otherwise available to indi-
vidual students as a condition of participating in extracurricular activi-
ties.272 As discussed in Sections III.A and III.B, doing so creates a chill-
ing effect, hampering
reporting of abuse.273 
 In school-sponsored extracurricular activities, applying Hazelwood 
often treats an extracurricular activity like the classroom where the 
school, as a government institution, has an interest in controlling its 
message.274 In these contexts, the educational goal of restricting stu-
dent speech may be more obvious because the speech itself is central to 
the activity, such as where the speech is the content of a newspaper arti-
cle.275 The forecast of disruption standard, however, has been applied 
                                                                                                                      
269 See, e.g., Cameron Smith, Florida Freshman Dies After Collapsing at Football Practice, Ya-
hoo! Sports (Sept. 8, 2009, 9:49 AM), http://rivals.yahoo.com/highschool/blog/prep_ 
rally/post/Florida-freshman-dies-after-collapsing-at-footba?urn=highschool-268071 (report-
ing the death of a high school football player after his collapse in practice, possibly due to 
heat exhaustion); High School Football Coach Charged in Player’s Death, CNN Justice ( Jan. 26, 
2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-01-26/justice/football.coach.indicted_1_jason-stinson- 
max-gilpin-grand-jury?_s=PM:CRIME (reporting the death from heat exhaustion of a high 
school football player after his coach reportedly denied him water during practice on a hot 
day New Yorker, Jan. 
31, 
restriction is to avoid potential 
disr n by demonstrating “a sig-
nifi
 in August). See generally Ben McGrath, Does Football Have a Future?, 
2011, at 41 (describing the high risk of concussions associated with playing football). 
270 See Seamons I, 84 F.3d at 1237; see also Pinard, 467 F.3d at 768–69. 
271 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14; cf. Waldman, supra note 62, at 120 (arguing that, in 
the context of school-sponsored expressive activities to which Hazelwood applies, when a 
school’s pedagogical interest in applying a viewpoint-based 
uption, the school should establish the pedagogical concer
cant likelihood that disruption will result”). 
272 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; Seamons I, 84 F.3d at 1236. 
273 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; Seamons I, 84 F.3d at 1236. 
274 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73; Waldman, supra note 62, at 119–20. 
275 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71; Poling, 872 F.2d at 762. 
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beyond practice or competition—that is, outside the time and location 
of the extracurricular activity.276 Instead, speech outside of the activity 
 pu
ld reflect a more specific application of Tinker 
 ca
pose.284 A legitimate educational purpose might be upheld, however, if, 
is nished within the activity.277 In these cases, the educational goal 
that will potentially be disrupted by the speech is not always obvious, 
and the application of the standard conditions participation on re-
duced speech rights.278 
 This Note proposes requiring that when school officials rely on a 
forecast of disruption standard to suppress or punish student speech, 
they must demonstrate that the speech at issue would materially and 
substantially interfere with the educational goals of the particular activ-
ity.279 This standard wou
in ses in which (1) school officials restrict student speech based on 
forecasting disruption related to extracurricular activities and (2) the 
result is suppression or punishment related to those activities, such as 
removal from a team.280 
 In such cases, courts should require school officials to demonstrate 
based on particular facts that the disruption materially and substantially 
interferes with the educational goal of the particular activity (or other 
students’ rights), and not merely a broad view of the “work of the 
schools.”281 The forecast of disruption standard as applied to extracur-
ricular activities conditions participation on reduced speech rights, 
even if the student is speaking only with friends or administrators, out-
side of practice or competition.282 For example, disagreement with a 
coach’s opinion alone—expressed among students, outside of prac-
tice—would not be sufficient to demonstrate disruption absent further 
inquiry into the educational purpose disrupted.283 Suppression of a 
challenge to authority in such contexts has no clear educational pur-
                                                                                                                      
276 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 586, 599–600; Pinard, 467 F.3d at 759–61. 
277 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 586, 599–600; Pinard, 467 F.3d at 759–61. 
278 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 594 (reasoning that the student petition challenged the coach’s 
auth
rganized school activity). 
ndrea, supra note 26, at 1090–92. 
Lowery, 497 F.3d at 603, 605 (Gilman, J., concur-
ring 
, 393 U.S. at 508, 513; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 601 (Gilman, J., concurring in 
the 
ority and threatened team unity); Pinard, 467 F.3d at 772 (holding that the students’ 
refusal to board the bus to basketball game disrupted an o
279 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 603 (Gilman, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Papa
280 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510, 512–14; 
in the judgment); Wildman, 249 F.3d at 771–72. 
281 See Tinker
judgment). 
282 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 592–93. 
283 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 601–03 (Gilman, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
284 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; Chemerinksy, supra note 26, at 835–36. 
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for example, a coach punished a player who ridiculed a fellow player 
about that player’s basketball skills, and it materially and substantially 
affected the victim’s ability to advance skills in practice.285 Requiring a 
showing that forecasted disruption will interfere with the educational 
oal
ng mission of public 
schools is to educate students.288 The standard this Note proposes con-
nects the restriction of poten  speech to the educational 
rp
g  of a particular activity will ensure that, consistent with Tinker, the 
burden remains with schools, not students, to demonstrate material, 
substantial disruption of the activity.286 
 Furthermore, tying the analysis to the educational purpose of the 
activity addresses the problem of comparing student speech related to 
extracurricular activities to public employee speech.287 As discussed in 
Section III.B, schools as government institutions have a fundamentally 
different goal from that of other public institutions; unlike the contrac-
tual nature of public employment, the overarchi
tially disruptive
pu ose that would be potentially disrupted.289 
Conclusion 
 Student speech in extracurricular activities occupies a doctrinal 
position between individual speech and curricular speech. Beyond the 
narrow categories governed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and Morse v. Frederick, courts tend to 
treat extracurricular student speech as either curriculum-like, school-
sponsored speech under Hazelwood, when the activities are inherently 
expressive, or as individual speech under Tinker. Applying Tinker’s fore-
cast of disruption standard, particularly when supported by analogies to 
                                                                                                                      
285 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. Further, removing a player from competition for yell-
ing at a referee in a disrespectful manner might also be permissible under this standard 
because the punishment itself teaches sportsmanship. See id.; see also Zamecnik v. Indian 
Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 636 F.3d 874, 878–79 (7th Cir. 2011) (reaffirming the panel deci-
sion granting summary judgment in favor of students who were prohibited from wearing t-
shirts with a homophobic message in school and specifying that facts that might lead to 
forecasting substantial disruption may include “a decline in students’ test scores, an up-
surge in truancy, or other symptoms of a sick school”); Chemerinksy, supra note 26, at 835–
36. 
286 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 603 (Gilman, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
287 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 596–600; Pinard, 467 F.3d at 765–66. 
288 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; Chemerinksy, supra note 26, at 835–36; supra notes 
255–270 and accompanying text. 
289 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14; Lowery, 497 F.3d at 603 (Gilman, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1090–92 (criticizing a “territorial approach” to stu-
dent digital speech and the use of Tinker’s forecast of disruption standard to such speech). 
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ns 
restricting students’ Fourth Amendment rights. Th
conditioning participation on giving up speech rig
educational goals of extracurricular activities and of public schools. This 
Note proposes requiring that school officials using a forecast of disrup-
tion standard to punish student speech must connect the speech restric-
tion to the educational goal of the particular extracurricular activity. 
Rebecca L. Zeidel 
public employee speech, poses doctrinal and practical problems. This 
standard has a chilling effect that conditions student participation in 
extracurricular activities on reduced speech rights, similar to conditio
is Note argues that 
hts contradicts the 
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